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Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility

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  • JAMES M. BUCHANAN

    (George Mason University)

Abstract
Individuals retain control over at least some minimal dimensions of personal behavior. If this is acknowledged, social states are not, and cannot be, objects of choice. Social states emerge from the interdependent choices made by acting individuals and groups. Individuals may ordinally rank social states, but the objects for collective choice must be assignments of rights or rules. Failure to appreciate the distinction here leads to misguided efforts to attain positions that may be imagined but that are beyond the limits of behavioral feasibility .

Suggested Citation

  • James M. Buchanan, 1995. "Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 141-150, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:2:p:141-150
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007002002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, April.
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    5. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 114-114.
    6. James Buchanan, 1993. "How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-6, December.
    7. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Franke, Marcel, 2022. "Transfer in a conflict model as a reason for (unconditional) basic income," FRIBIS Discussion Paper Series 03-2022, University of Freiburg, Freiburg Institute for Basic Income Studies (FRIBIS).
    4. Martin Leschke, 2000. "Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 265-279, September.

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