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A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination

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  • BRADFORD CORNELL

    (University of California, Los Angeles)

Abstract
This article develops an explanation for ethnic discrimination based on what can be called “social decoding.†It is hypothesized that humans have developed unique cognitive skills for discerning situations in which others will behave in a self-interested opportunistic fashion. However, these cognitive skills, like the human ability to acquire language, are effectuated by environmental programming. Consequently, people will be able to decode accurately only when dealing with others of similar type. From this it follows that when selecting the “best†candidate from several populations each of which contain a large number of people, an individual will almost certainly end up choosing someone from the population that she or he can more accurately decode. Therefore, assuming that a common ethnic background is associated with more accurate decoding, people will appear to discriminate in favor of others who are ethnically similar. Ironically, this “discrimination†arises because people cannot discriminate as accurately when dealing with members of a dissimilar population.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradford Cornell, 1995. "A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 4-30, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:4-30
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wilson, James Q., 1993. "The Moral Sense," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 1-11, March.
    2. Glenn C. Loury, 1994. "Self-Censorship in Public Discourse," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(4), pages 428-461, October.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    4. Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Affections and the Passions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(2), pages 185-202, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Hechter, 1995. "Comment on Cornell," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 489-491, October.
    2. Thomas Wagner, 1998. "Reciprocity And Efficiency," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(3), pages 347-375, August.
    3. Arieh Gavious & Shlomo Mizrahi, 1999. "Two-Level Collective Action and Group Identity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 497-517, October.
    4. Murat Somer, 2001. "Cascades of Ethnic Polarization: Lessons from Yugoslavia," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 573(1), pages 127-151, January.
    5. Scott Sigmund Gartner & Gary M. Segura, 1997. "Appearances Can Be Deceptive," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(2), pages 131-161, May.

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