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The use of economic analysis in antitrust proceedings: an empirical study

Author

Listed:
  • Kurdin, Alexander

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Shastitko, Anastasia

    (Universite Paris-1 Panthåon-Sorbonne)

Abstract
The article presents an empirical study of the use of economic analysis when considering antitrust cases in Russia. The use of economic analysis in antitrust proceedings has long been provided for orders of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia. However, economic analysis, firstly, is not always necessary, and secondly, it is carried out with varying thoroughness and using different tools. The authors of the study sample study Russian antitrust proceedings for 2007-2011, using quantitative methods, and come to the conclusion that the economic analysis does not bring additional time costs, its application or contest can promote a favorable outcome for the Party, and the use of specific instruments depends on type of alleged violations of the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurdin, Alexander & Shastitko, Anastasia, 2013. "The use of economic analysis in antitrust proceedings: an empirical study," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 91-111, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1344
    as

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    File URL: https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1344.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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