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Camaleones: el mal uso de modelos teóricos en finanzas y economía

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Pfleiderer
Abstract
En este ensayo muestro que los modelos teóricos en finanzas y economía se usan de un modo que los vuelven “camaleones”, y que los camaleones devalúan la moneda intelectual y enturbian los debates de política. Un modelo se convierte en camaleón cuando se basa en supuestos con conexiones dudosas con el mundo real pero sus conclusiones se aplican acríticamente (o sin suficiente crítica) para entender la economía. Muestro que los camaleones son creados y alimentados por la idea errónea de que un modelo no se debe juzgar por sus supuestos, por el argumento infundado de que los modelos deben estar en pie de igualdad hasta que se hagan pruebas empíricas definitivas, por apelaciones improcedentes a argumentos “como si”, a la elegancia matemática, a la sutileza, por referencias a supuestos “estándar en la literatura”, y por la necesidad de manejabilidad.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pfleiderer, 2014. "Camaleones: el mal uso de modelos teóricos en finanzas y economía," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 16(31), pages 23-30, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:16:y:2014:i:31:p:23-30
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/ppfleiderer31.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    modelos teóricos; finanzas; economía;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General

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