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Ideology, swing voters, and taxation

Author

Listed:
  • David Juarez-Luna

    (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A. C.)

Abstract
Ideas about ethnicity, religion, and nationalism among others, which we label "ideology", seem to affect the preferences of voters, political parties and finally, the equilibrium policy. In this paper we provide a political-economic model that traces the influence of ideology on determining the tax rate in political competition. What we found is that, when the salience of ideology increases, the cohort of voters with the median ideological view become the swing voters. Then, the equilibrium tax rate benefits that cohort of voters.

Suggested Citation

  • David Juarez-Luna, 2016. "Ideology, swing voters, and taxation," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 13(1), pages 7-28, Enero-Jun.
    • Handle: RePEc:qua:journl:v:13:y:2016:i:1:p:7-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, September.
    2. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529.
    3. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
    4. John E. Roemer, 1999. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 1-20, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cornelsen, Laura & Smith, Richard D., 2018. "Viewpoint: Soda taxes – Four questions economists need to address," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 138-142.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Political equilibrium; Ideology; Swing voters.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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