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Competitive Equilibrium with Type Convergence in an Asymmetrically Informed Market

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  • Thakor, Anjan V
Abstract
This article studies an asymmetric information game with "type convergence," in which, under some realizations of a common uncertainity, inducing informed agents to reveal their types through self-selection by contract choice is either costly or impossible. Under other realizations, self-selection permits costless distinctions between informed agents. I obtain sufficient conditions under which contracting with options prior to the realization of the common uncertainity leads to the existence of a perfectly separating, costless Nash equilibrium. Applications to variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contracting are discussed. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Thakor, Anjan V, 1989. "Competitive Equilibrium with Type Convergence in an Asymmetrically Informed Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 49-71.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:2:y:1989:i:1:p:49-71
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    Cited by:

    1. Kraus, Daniel, 2013. "Does borrowers' impatience disclose their hidden information about default risk?," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 132, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    2. Stanhouse, Bryan & Schwarzkopf, Al & Ingram, Matt, 2011. "A computational approach to pricing a bank credit line," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1341-1351, June.
    3. Luísa Farinha & Sónia Félix & João A. C. Santos, 2019. "Bank Funding and the Survival of Start-ups," Working Papers w201919, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    4. Houston, Joel F. & Venkataraman, S., 1996. "Liquidation under moral hazard: Optimal debt maturity and loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 115-133, January.
    5. Chateau, J.-P. & Wu, J., 2007. "Basel-2 capital adequacy: Computing the `fair' capital charge for loan commitment `true' credit risk," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Marc Cowling & Weixi Liu & Maria Minniti & Ning Zhang, 2016. "UK credit and discouragement during the GFC," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 1049-1074, December.

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