[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v29y2016i7p1821-1859..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Don't All Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust-Preferred Securities

Author

Listed:
  • Nicole M. Boyson
  • Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
  • René M. Stulz
Abstract
We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust-preferred securities issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage. Received November 27, 2014; accepted December 17, 2015 by Editor Philip Strahan.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole M. Boyson & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, 2016. "Why Don't All Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust-Preferred Securities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1821-1859.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:29:y:2016:i:7:p:1821-1859.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhw007
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jiang, Hai & Yuan, Chao, 2022. "Monetary policy, capital regulation and bank risk-taking：Evidence from China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    2. Mahmoud Fatouh & Ioana Neamtu & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2022. "Risk-Taking, Competition and Uncertainty: Do Contingent Convertible (CoCo) Bonds Increase the Risk Appetite of Banks?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-017/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Efing, Matthias, 2015. "Arbitraging the Basel securitization framework: Evidence from German ABS investment," Discussion Papers 40/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Puriya Abbassi & Rajkamal Iyer & José-Luis Peydró & Paul E. Soto, 2020. "Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review," Working Papers 1178, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Chen, Jiakai, 2022. "Market discipline and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from ABCP liquidity guarantors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    6. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    7. Dong Beom Choi & Michael R. Holcomb & Donald P. Morgan, 2020. "Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question‐New Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(S1), pages 241-266, October.
    8. Fulvia Fringuellotti & João A. C. Santos, 2021. "Insurance Companies and the Growth of Corporate Loans' Securitization," Staff Reports 975, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Gabriel A. Ogunmola & Fengsheng Chien & Ka Yin Chau & Li Li, 2022. "The Influence of Capital Requirement of Basel III Adoption on Banks’ Operating Efficiency: Evidence from U.S. Banks," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(2), pages 5-26.
    10. Gropp, Reint & Mosk, Thomas & Ongena, Steven & Simac, Ines & Wix, Carlo, 2024. "Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 830-862, March.
    11. Fatouh, Mahmoud & Neamțu, Ioana & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2021. "Risk-taking and uncertainty: do contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds increase the risk appetite of banks?," Bank of England working papers 938, Bank of England.
    12. Yann Braouezec & Keyvan Kiani, 2021. "Target capital ratio and optimal channel(s) of adjustment: A simple model with empirical applications to European banks," Post-Print halshs-03341768, HAL.
    13. Conlon, Thomas & Cotter, John & Molyneux, Philip, 2020. "Beyond common equity: The influence of secondary capital on bank insolvency risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    14. Abbassi, Puriya & Schmidt, Michael, 2018. "A comprehensive view on risk reporting: Evidence from supervisory data," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 74-85.
    15. Hugonnier, Julien & Morellec, Erwan, 2017. "Bank capital, liquid reserves, and insolvency risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 266-285.
    16. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Fatouh, Mahmoud & Neamtu, Ioana, 2020. "Risk-Taking, Competition and Uncertainty: Do CoCo Bonds Increase the Risk Appetite of Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 14530, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Pennacchi, George G. & Santos, João A.C., 2021. "Why do banks target ROE?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    18. Dal Borgo, Mariela, 2022. "Internal models for deposits: Effects on banks' capital and interest rate risk of assets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    19. Thomas Conlon & Xing Huan & Steven Ongena, 2020. "Operational Risk Capital," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-55, Swiss Finance Institute.
    20. Judit Temesvary, 2018. "The Role Of Regulatory Arbitrage In U.S. Banks' International Flows: Bank‐Level Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2077-2098, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:29:y:2016:i:7:p:1821-1859.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.