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Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability

Author

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  • Tracy R. Lewis
  • David E. M. Sappington
Abstract
We examine the optimal design of contracts when an agent is privately informed about his wealth, his ability, and his effort supply. We find that the agent's wealth and ability act as perfect complements in determining the power of the incentive scheme under which he operates. Only if his ability and his wealth both increase can an agent be assured of operating under a more powerful scheme. Consequently, severe under-utilization of wealth and ability arise in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 21-44.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:21-44.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00158
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    Cited by:

    1. Felipe Balmaceda, 2020. "Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 601-637, June.
    2. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
    3. Chifeng Dai, 2009. "Wealth constraint and contractual arrangements," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(1), pages 226-243, February.
    4. Xinyu Hua, 2007. "Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 786-803, September.
    5. Kragl, Jenny & Schöttner, Anja, 2011. "Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design," VfS Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48731, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting under unverifiable monetary costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 892-909, October.
    7. Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 525-550, May.
    8. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2008. "The Regulator and the Judge : The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(6), pages 941-967.
    9. Yaron Yehezkel, 2014. "Motivating a Supplier to Test Product Quality," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 309-345, June.
    10. Uwe Jirjahn, 2006. "A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal–Agent Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 235-252, July.
    11. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2015. "Moral hazard and capability," Working Papers hal-02795218, HAL.
    12. Quintero Jaramillo, Jose E., 2004. "Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb040604, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    13. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 2000. "Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 944-960, September.
    14. David Rietzke, 2015. "Push or pull? Grants, prizes and information," Working Papers 82851479, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    15. Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    16. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Felipe Balmaceda, 2012. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Documentos de Trabajo 291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    18. Nicolas Querou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2015. "Motivating versus Funding," Working Papers 15-11, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2015.
    19. Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli & Tomas Sjöström, 2001. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 781-810.
    20. Mario Tirelli, 2021. "On the optimal investment finance of small businesses," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1639-1665, April.
    21. Mario Tirelli, 2017. "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0230, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.

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