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What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen J. Choi
  • Mitu Gulati
  • Eric A. Posner
Abstract
Evidence from a data set of federal district judges from 2001 and 2002 suggests that district judges adjust their opinion-writing practices to minimize their workload while maximizing their reputation and chance for elevation to a higher court. District judges in circuits with politically uniform circuit judges are better able to predict what opinions will get affirmed by the circuit court, leading to higher publication rates and a higher affirmance rate. In contrast, district judges in circuits with politically diverse circuit judges are less able to predict the preferences of the reviewing circuit court panel, leading district judges to publish fewer but higher-quality opinions in an effort to maximize their affirmance rate (JEL K40, K41, K49). The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, 2012. "What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 518-549, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:518-549
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewq020
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Samantha Bielen & Wim Marneffe & Peter Grajzl & Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, 2018. "The Duration of Judicial Deliberation: Evidence from Belgium," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(2), pages 303-333, June.
    2. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2017. "Judicial decision making under changing legal standards: The case of dismissal arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 108-126.
    3. Christina L. Boyd, 2015. "The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 113-141.
    4. Przemysław Banasik & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Małgorzata Godlewska & Sylwia Morawska, 2022. "Determinants of judges’ career choices and productivity: a Polish case study," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 81-107, February.
    5. Peter Grajzl & Shikha Silwal, 2020. "The functioning of courts in a developing economy: evidence from Nepal," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 101-129, February.
    6. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
    7. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Elena Sidorova, 2022. "Does judicial effort matter for quality? Evidence from antitrust proceedings in Russian commercial courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 425-450, June.
    8. John Szmer & Robert K. Christensen & Samuel Grubbs, 2020. "What influences the influence of U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 55-81, February.
    9. Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, 2015. "The Role of Competence in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 107-131.
    10. Bielen, Samantha & Grajzl, Peter & Marneffe, Wim, 2017. "Procedural events, judge characteristics, and the timing of settlement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 97-110.
    11. Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina & Grajzl, Peter & Slavov, Atanas & Zajc, Katarina, 2016. "Courts in a transition economy: Case disposition and the quantity–quality tradeoff in Bulgaria," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 18-38.
    12. Duy Vu & Michele Pezzoni & Duc Lam Nguyen, 2021. "Arbitrator teams and dispute resolution performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 347-381, April.
    13. Samantha Bielen & Peter Grajzl & Wim Marneffe, 2017. "Understanding the Time to Court Case Resolution: A Competing Risks Analysis Using Belgian Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 6450, CESifo.
    14. Adam B. Badawi & Scott Baker, 2015. "Appellate Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 139-172.
    15. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2020. "Judicial arbitration of unfair dismissal cases: The role of peer effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Romain Espinosa & Claudine Desrieux & Hengrui Wan, 2017. "Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts," Post-Print halshs-01634211, HAL.
    17. Tran, Tuyen & Vu, Huong, 2013. "Farmland loss, nonfarm diversification and inequality: A micro-econometric analysis of household surveys in Vietnam," MPRA Paper 47596, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Allen Huang & Kai Wai Hui & Reeyarn Zhiyang Li, 2019. "Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 431-489, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other

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