The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102, March.
- David Martimort & Philippe De Donder & Etienne Billette De Villemeur, 2005.
"An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 149-180, April.
- Martimort, David & De Donder, Philippe & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," IDEI Working Papers 212, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1995.
"Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1405-1428, August.
- Trond Olsen & Gaute Torsvik, 1993. "Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much Decentralization?," CESifo Working Paper Series 37, CESifo.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018.
"Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2017. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses ?," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-11, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02087821, HAL.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/284774, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Post-Print halshs-02087821, HAL.
- Martimort, David, 1996.
"The multiprincipal nature of government,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
- David Martimort, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government [[La nature multiprincipal du gouvernement]]," Post-Print hal-02688299, HAL.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014.
"Delegation and dynamic incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- Strausz, Roland & Shin, Dongsoo, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009.
"Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43903, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Post-Print hal-02056888, HAL.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004.
"The subsidiarity bias in regulation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jérome Pouyet, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," SERIES 0001, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Jun 2000.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 96, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996.
"Limited intertemporal commitment and job design,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
- Trond Olsen & Gaute Torsvik, 1994. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 77, CESifo.
- Meyer, M.A. & Olsen, T.E. & Torsvik, G., 1995. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," Economics Papers 102, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 1-17, December.
- Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank.
- Tangerås, Thomas P., 2012.
"Optimal transmission regulation of an integrated energy market,"
Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1644-1655.
- Tangerås, Thomas P., 2010. "Optimal Transmission Regulation in an Integrated Energy Market," Working Paper Series 838, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
- Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.
- David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010.
"The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-229, February.
- David Martimort & Salvatore piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," Post-Print halshs-00754478, HAL.
- Meyer, Margaret A., 1995. "Cooperation and competition in organizations: A dynamic perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 709-722, April.
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Thorsten Janus, 2009. "Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 264-275, May.
- Siqueira, Kevin Jay, 1998. "Issues of collective action: common agency, partial cooperation, and clubs," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000013526, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Giulio Federico, 2001. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2001-16, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
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