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Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference

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  • Philip M. Fernbach
  • Steven A. Sloman
  • Robert St. Louis
  • Julia N. Shube
Abstract
People differ in their threshold for satisfactory causal understanding and therefore in the type of explanation that will engender understanding and maximize the appeal of a novel product. Explanation fiends are dissatisfied with surface understanding and desire detailed mechanistic explanations of how products work. In contrast, explanation foes derive less understanding from detailed than coarse explanations and downgrade products that are explained in detail. Consumers' attitude toward explanation is predicted by their tendency to deliberate, as measured by the cognitive reflection test. Cognitive reflection also predicts susceptibility to the illusion of explanatory depth, the unjustified belief that one understands how things work. When explanation foes attempt to explain, it exposes the illusion, which leads to a decrease in willingness to pay. In contrast, explanation fiends are willing to pay more after generating explanations. We hypothesize that those low in cognitive reflection are explanation foes because explanatory detail shatters their illusion of understanding.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip M. Fernbach & Steven A. Sloman & Robert St. Louis & Julia N. Shube, 2013. "Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 39(5), pages 1115-1131.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jconrs:doi:10.1086/667782
    DOI: 10.1086/667782
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    Cited by:

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    2. Arunachalam Narayanan & Brent B. Moritz, 2015. "Decision Making and Cognition in Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: An Experimental Study," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(8), pages 1216-1234, August.
    3. repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:6:p:909-925 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Keli Saporta, 2020. "Are Technological Terms Seductive? The Effect of Technological Terms on Persuasion," Business and Management Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 2839-2839, December.
    5. Sung-Bum Kim & Seunghwan Lee & Dae-Young Kim, 2018. "The effect of service providers’ facial hair on restaurant customers’ perceptions," Service Business, Springer;Pan-Pacific Business Association, vol. 12(2), pages 277-303, June.
    6. Ethan A. Meyers & Martin H. Turpin & Michał Białek & Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Derek J. Koehler, 2020. "Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(6), pages 909-925, November.

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