[Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy]"> [Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy]"> [Opportunisti">
[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecpoli/v24y2009i59p509-550..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Elections and economic policy in developing countries
[Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy]

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa Chauvet
  • Paul Collier
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of elections on economic policies and governance in developing countries. We distinguish between a structural effect, which increases accountability, and a cyclical effect which may be disruptive. Since the effects are offsetting, neither can be analysed in isolation. We implement an econometric analysis on more than 80 developing countries using positive changes in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment of the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide as signalling improvements in economic policy and governance. We find that both structural and cyclical effects matter. The cyclical effect suggests that mid-term is the best moment for policy change. We investigate the structural effect by comparing different frequencies of elections. Except at the extremes, a higher frequency of elections improves both policy and governance net of any cyclical effect. The important exception to this benign net effect is if the electoral process is badly conducted. Badly conducted elections have no structural efficacy for policy improvement. A reasonable interpretation of our results is that honest elections increase accountability and thereby discipline governments to improve economic policy and governance, but that if candidates can win by fraud this chain is broken.—Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Chauvet & Paul Collier, 2009. "Elections and economic policy in developing countries [Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 24(59), pages 509-550.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:24:y:2009:i:59:p:509-550.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2009.00228.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521793797, September.
    2. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521790321, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Collier & Pedro Vicente, 2012. "Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 117-147, October.
    2. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2010. "Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2010-35, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Clémence VERGNE, 2009. "Turnout in Developing Countries: The Effect of Mass Media on National Voter Participation," Working Papers 200929, CERDI.
    4. Antonio C. David & Can Sever, 2024. "Electoral cycles in tax reforms," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 495-529, August.
    5. Marcelin, Isaac & Stephen, Sheryl-Ann K. & Fanta, Fassil & Tecklezion, Mussie, 2019. "Political regimes, investment and electoral uncertainty," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 580-599.
    6. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack, 2018. "World Bank Policy Lending and the Quality of Public-Sector Governance," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(1), pages 29-54.
    7. Andrea Colombo & Olivia D'Aoust & Olivier Sterck, 2019. "From Rebellion to Electoral Violence: Evidence from Burundi," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(2), pages 333-368.
    8. Armey, Laura E. & McNab, Robert M., 2012. "Democratization and civil war," MPRA Paper 42460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Dercon, Stefan & Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana, 2012. "Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 731-744.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Fiorino, 2011. "Explaining national environmental performance: approaches, evidence, and implications," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 44(4), pages 367-389, November.
    2. Pettersson, Jan, 2003. "Democracy, Consolidation and Growth," Research Papers in Economics 2002:16, Stockholm University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Dec 2004.
    3. Matteo Cervellati & Alireza Naghavi & Farid Toubal, 2018. "Trade liberalization, democratization, and technology adoption," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 145-173, June.
    4. Snigdha Dewal & Jack A. Goldstone & Michael Volpe, 2013. "Forecasting Stability or Retreat in Emerging Democratic Regimes," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 1(1), pages 32-47.
    5. Hubert Tworzecki, 2019. "Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 681(1), pages 97-119, January.
    6. Dincecco, Mark & Katz, Gabriel, 2012. "State Capacity and Long-Run Performance," MPRA Paper 38299, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ming‐Chang Tsai, 2006. "Does Political Democracy Enhance Human Development in Developing Countries?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 233-268, April.
    8. Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 167-188, Spring.
    9. Mohammad Amin & Priya Ranjan, 2008. "When Does Legal Origin Matter?," Working Papers 080912, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    10. Bautista, M. A. & González, F. & Martínez, L. R. & Muñoz, P. & Prem, M., 2020. "Chile’s Missing Students: Dictatorship, Higher Education and Social Mobility," Documentos de Trabajo 18163, Universidad del Rosario.
    11. Cáceres, Neila & Malone, Samuel W., 2015. "Optimal Weather Conditions, Economic Growth, and Political Transitions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 16-30.
    12. Jakob Haan, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 281-292, June.
    13. Michelle Albert Vachris & Justin P. Isaacs, 2017. "The Role of Cultural Values in the Formation and Survival of Pro-Growth Institutions," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 32(Spring 20), pages 89-113.
    14. Rose, Richard, 2007. "Evaluating democratic governance: A bottom up approach to European Union enlargement," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Inequality and Social Integration SP I 2007-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    15. Robert Mattes, 2014. "South Africa's Emerging Black Middle Class: A Harbinger of Political Change?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2014-147, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    16. Michiel Vries & Iwona Sobis, 2014. "Reluctant Reforms: The Case of Kazakhstan," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 139-157, June.
    17. Ahmed Raza ul MUSTAFA* & Mohammad NISHAT**, 2017. "ROLE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN POVERTY REDUCTION IN PAKISTAN: A Quantitative Approach," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88.
    18. Gisselquist, Rachel & Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel, 2013. "What can experiments tell us about how to improve governance?," MPRA Paper 49300, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 10178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. NARITA Yusuke & SUDO Ayumi, 2021. "Curse of Democracy: Evidence from 2020," Discussion papers 21034, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:24:y:2009:i:59:p:509-550.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cebruuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.