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An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress

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  • Groseclose, Tim
Abstract
This paper examines the strategies that 'horse traders' and 'power brokers' adopt in trading favors to pass legislation. Although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe, the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading. With data from the Senate vote on the Byrd Amendment to the 1990 Clean Air Act, the author conducts such a test. The test provides evidence that, on this vote, favor trading occurred, the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination, and the coalition leaders did not collude with one another. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Groseclose, Tim, 1996. "An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(2), pages 320-340, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:34:y:1996:i:2:p:320-40
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    Cited by:

    1. David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority‐Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, March.
    2. Alain Verbeke & Liena Kano, 2013. "The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of trading favors," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 409-431, June.
    3. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    4. John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Matthew N. Beckmann & Anthony J. McGann, 2008. "Navigating the Legislative Divide," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 201-220, April.

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