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Tax Motivated Takings

Author

Listed:
  • Miceli, Thomas J.
  • Segerson, Kathleen
  • Sirmans, C.F.
Abstract
Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners’ true values. We, therefore, propose a reassessment scheme that may reduce the risk of this sort of inefficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen & Sirmans, C.F., 2008. "Tax Motivated Takings," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 61(4), pages 579-591, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:61:y:2008:i:4:p:579-91
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2008.4.01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 9(1), pages 160-174.
    2. Steven Shavell, 2007. "Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation," NBER Working Papers 13564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. McFarlane, Nick & Hurley, Joe & Sun, Qian (Chayn), 2023. "Private-led land assembly and urban consolidation: The relative influence of regulatory zoning mechanisms," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    2. Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2021. "Assessing Kelo’s Legacy: Do Increased Taxes and New Jobs Justify Use of Eminent Domain?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 161-176, August.
    4. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
    5. Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
    6. Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "The Cost of Kelo: Are Property Taxes a Form of Public Use?," Working papers 2014-35, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

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