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Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution

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  • Little, Andrew T.
Abstract
Elections are modeled as a public signal in an incomplete information game of revolution. By changing beliefs about the general level of anti-regime sentiment, elections can make citizens more or less apt to rebel and hence make a successful revolution more or less likely. This effect makes elections valuable to incumbents that are not secure in office as they have more to gain by good results than they have to lose from bad results. Electoral fraud is modeled as a distortion of the public signal, and election monitoring is incorporated as changing the cost of this distortion. In equilibrium, citizens discount the distortion, so the average protest size and probability of revolution are the same as when the incumbent cannot commit fraud. This makes election monitoring valuable to incumbents as it ties their hands and lowers the equilibrium amount of fraud. So, elections may be held that would not occur in the absence of monitoring.

Suggested Citation

  • Little, Andrew T., 2012. "Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 7(3), pages 249-283, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00011078
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00011078
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    Cited by:

    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2024. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 594-636, June.
    2. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Pablo Hernández‐Lagos, 2019. "Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(4), pages 584-604, September.
    3. Hannah Smidt, 2021. "Keeping electoral peace? Activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and their effects on election-related violence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 580-604, September.
    4. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Tiberiu Dragu, 2017. "On repression and its effectiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 599-622, October.
    6. Przeworski, Adam & Rivero, Gonzalo & Xi, Tianyang, 2015. "Elections as a conflict processing mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 235-248.
    7. Willemien Kets & Alvaro Sandroni, 2021. "A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 287-333.
    8. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    9. Hao Hong & Tsz-Ning Wong, 2020. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 460-493, July.
    10. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    11. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
    12. Henrikas BartuseviÄ ius & Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2018. "Revisiting democratic civil peace," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(5), pages 625-640, September.
    13. Frye, Timothy & Borisova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Elections, protest and trust in government: A natural experiment from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2016, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    14. Escobari, Diego & Hoover, Gary A., 2024. "Late-Arriving Votes and Electoral Fraud: A Natural Experiment and Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Bolivia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    15. Andrew T Little, 2017. "Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 214-242, April.
    16. Pantelis Kammas & Vassilis Sarantides, 2016. "Fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 279-311, September.
    17. Gail Buttorff & Douglas Dion, 2017. "Participation and boycott in authoritarian elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 97-123, January.
    18. Edmond, Chris & Lu, Yang K., 2021. "Creating confusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    19. Matt Malis & Alastair Smith, 2019. "A global game of diplomacy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 480-506, October.
    20. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022. "Information manipulation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 245-263.

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