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Equity, Institutions and the Development Process

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  • James A. Robinson

    (Harvard University)

Abstract
In this essay I argue that to develop institutions that promote economic development societies must be equitable in fundamental ways. I particularly emphasize how important an equitable distribution of political power in society is to have well functioning institutions that support market activities. I show these ideas are consistent with broad patterns in the cross-national data and country case studies.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Robinson, 2006. "Equity, Institutions and the Development Process," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 32, pages 17-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:32:y:2006:p:17-50
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bhattacharyya, Sambit, 2009. "Institutions, diseases, and economic progress: a unified framework," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 65-87, April.
    3. Ivan Gachet & Diego F. Grijalva & Paúl A. Ponce & Damián Rodríguez, 2019. "Vertical and Horizontal Inequality in Ecuador: The Lack of Sustainability," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 861-900, October.
    4. Constantine, Collin & Khemraj, Tarron, 2019. "Geography, economic structures and institutions: A synthesis," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 371-379.
    5. Pedro Funari, 2016. "Institutions, Inequality, And Long-Term Development: A Perspective From Brazilian Regions," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 019, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].

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