The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-010-9264-6
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Cited by:
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- Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 2015. "Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5543, CESifo.
- Robert M. Feinberg, 2023. "Patterns and Determinants of Canadian Anti-Cartel and Antidumping Policy: 1990–2019," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 309-327, December.
- Philippon, Thomas & Gutierrez, German, 2018. "How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift," CEPR Discussion Papers 12983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gao, Ning & Peng, Ni & Strong, Norman, 2017. "What determines horizontal merger antitrust case selection?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 51-76.
- Robert M. Feinberg, 2014. "State antitrust enforcement in the US and implications for small business entry and relocation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(7), pages 769-779, March.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted, 2013.
"Do States Free Ride In Antitrust Enforcement?,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 997-1001, January.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted, 2011. "Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?," Working Papers 2011-07, American University, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
Antitrust enforcement; Political economy;Statistics
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