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The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players

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  • Takeshi Yamazaki
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  • Takeshi Yamazaki, 2009. "The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 335-342, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:3:p:335-342
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9396-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    2. J. David Pérez-Castrillo & Thierry Verdier, 1992. "A general analysis of rent-seeking games," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 133-148, Springer.
    3. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, April.
    4. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 1-25, October.
    5. Konrad, Kai A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1997. "Risk Aversion in Rent-Seeking and Rent-Augmenting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1671-1683, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schwarz Mordechai E., 2019. "From Jungle to Civilized Economy: The Power Foundation of Exchange Economy Equilibrium," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-14, June.
    2. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    3. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
    4. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    6. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
    7. Ali Yekkehkhany & Timothy Murray & Rakesh Nagi, 2021. "Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 153-168, June.
    8. Pelin G. Canbolat, 2019. "Stochastic Contests with Linex Utility Functions," Alphanumeric Journal, Bahadir Fatih Yildirim, vol. 7(1), pages 113-128, June.
    9. Paan Jindapon & Christopher Whaley, 2015. "Risk lovers and the rent over-investment puzzle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 87-101, July.
    10. Schroyen, Fred & Treich, Nicolas, 2016. "The power of money: Wealth effects in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 46-68.
    11. Marco Sahm, 2017. "Risk Aversion and Prudence in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6417, CESifo.
    12. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2023. "A master of two servants: lessons from the israeli experience about the effect of separation of powers on public accountability and social welfare," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 59-87, March.
    13. Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2020. "Centralized versus decentralized contests with risk-averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    14. Mario Menegatti, 2021. "Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 269-287, July.

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