Contests with an unknown number of contestants
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9035-y
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Citations
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- Lim, Wooyoung & Matros, Alexander, 2009. "Contests with a stochastic number of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 584-597, November.
- Alexander Matros, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Paper 323, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
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- XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
- Martin Grossmann, 2021. "Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 289-316, December.
- Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
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More about this item
Keywords
Contest; Rent-seeking; Number uncertainty; Risk aversion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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