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Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists

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  • Atin Basuchoudhary
  • Laura Razzolini
Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency, as the Transportation Security Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda. The governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists, but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal. The terrorist organization's objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem. We derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model, and evaluate specific anti-terrorist policies, as the creation of the new Homeland Security Agency and increased airport security screening. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Atin Basuchoudhary & Laura Razzolini, 2006. "Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 245-255, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:245-255
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9052-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
    2. John Knowles & Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2001. "Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 203-232, February.
    3. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
    4. Cauley, Jon & Im, Eric Iksoon, 1988. "Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 27-31, May.
    5. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, September.
    6. Pape, Robert A., 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 343-361, August.
    7. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 1995. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aniruddha Bagchi & Jomon Aliyas Paul, 2014. "Optimal Allocation of Resources in Airport Security: Profiling vs. Screening," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 219-233, April.
    2. Song, Cen & Zhuang, Jun, 2017. "N-stage security screening strategies in the face of strategic applicants," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 292-301.
    3. Holt, Charles & Kydd, Andrew & Razzolini, Laura & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 56508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Wang, Xiaofang & Zhuang, Jun, 2011. "Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 100-111, July.
    5. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2011. "The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two‐stage Game," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(311), pages 546-564, July.

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