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Efficience informationnelle des marchés de l'or à Paris et à Londres, 1948-2008 : Une vérification économétrique de la forme faible

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  • Thi Hong Van HOANG
Abstract
La rationalité des opérateurs et les informations diffusées sur le marché sont au cœur de la théorie de l’efficience informationnelle des marchés financiers. Les marchés de l’or n’échappent pas à cette règle générale. Etant un actif très particulier et très différent des autres actifs financiers, le prix de l’or a connu dans son histoire plusieurs mouvements excessifs, soit à la hausse, soit à la baisse, qui remettent en cause l’hypothèse de l’efficience informationnelle. Tel est le cœur de ce papier qui cherche à tester la forme faible de l’efficience informationnelle des marchés de l’or à Paris et à Londres durant une période de 61 ans de 1948 à 2008. Les résultats des tests de Ljung-Box montrent qu’il existe une autocorrélation d’ordre 1 dans les séries des rentabilités mensuelles de la pièce d’or Napoléon à Paris ainsi que de l’once d’or au fixing de l’après-midi à Londres. L’hétéroscédasticité conditionnelle est détectée sur les rentabilités mensuelles par le test de l’effet ARCH. L’hypothèse que les prix suivent une marche aléatoire n’est pas acceptée par le test d’Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF). Ces résultats mènent alors à la conclusion que l’hypothèse de l’efficience informationnelle de la forme faible des marchés de l’or à Paris et à Londres sur la période de 1948 à 2008 ne peut pas être acceptée. Mais les résultats du test réalisé sur le modèle MEDAF montre que les investisseurs français ne peuvent pas profiter de cette inefficience informationnelle pour réaliser des profits anormaux (sauf sur la période de 1971 à 1981). Ce qui n’est pas le cas des investisseurs en or à Londres (sauf sur la période de 1981 à 2004).

Suggested Citation

  • Thi Hong Van HOANG, 2011. "Efficience informationnelle des marchés de l'or à Paris et à Londres, 1948-2008 : Une vérification économétrique de la forme faible," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 2(1), April.
  • Handle: RePEc:jaf:journl:v:2:y:2011:i:1:n:11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    L’efficience informationnelle; forme faible; marchés de l’or; Paris; Londres; informational efficiency; weak form; gold markets; Paris London;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School

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