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Key Factors in the Market for Remanufactured Products

Author

Listed:
  • Ravi Subramanian

    (College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

  • Ramanath Subramanyam

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois 61820)

Abstract
Measures to extend the economic lives of products--such as remanufacturing carried out by closed-loop supply chains --are receiving increased attention because of various economic and regulatory factors. In this paper, we examine drivers of price differentials between new and remanufactured products using data on purchases made on eBay. Our analysis shows that seller reputation significantly explains the price differentials between new and remanufactured products. We also find that products remanufactured by original equipment manufacturers or their authorized factories are purchased at relatively higher prices than products remanufactured by third parties. However, in the presence of these reputation signals (seller reputation and remanufacturer identity), we find that stronger warranties are not significantly associated with higher prices paid for remanufactured products. Our work contributes to the closed-loop supply chain research stream in operations management by empirically examining market factors that have not been studied before.

Suggested Citation

  • Ravi Subramanian & Ramanath Subramanyam, 2012. "Key Factors in the Market for Remanufactured Products," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 315-326, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:14:y:2012:i:2:p:315-326
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.1110.0368
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    References listed on IDEAS

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