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Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

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  • John G. Wilson

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106)

Abstract
The paradox involved in sequences of Prisoner's Dilemma games is due to the fact that game theoretic definitions of optimality rarely coincide with any natural meaning of the word. Decision makers should incorporate their beliefs and experience into any mathematical analysis of the games. Once this has been done, via subjective probabilities, use of the cooperative move in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games can often be justified. The paper provides a simple algorithm for determining an optimal strategy, once the decision maker's subjective probabilities have been specified.

Suggested Citation

  • John G. Wilson, 1986. "Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 45-55, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:1:p:45-55
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.32.1.45
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    Cited by:

    1. Luis Raul Rodriguez Reyes, 2018. "The halo effect, private knowledge and retirement fund choice: A theoretical model for the case of Mexico's Afores," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 15(2), pages 7-20, Julio-Dic.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; Prisoner's dilemma;

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