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Communication, Decision making, and the Optimal Degree of Transparency of Monetary Policy Committees

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  • Anke Weber

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members whose decisions and public communications are observed by the financial markets. It thereby provides a link between the literatures on monetary policy committees and central bank communication. The results show that transparency about the different views among committee members surrounding the economic outlook is beneficial. However, communicating the diversity of views about the monetary policy decision may not be welfare enhancing, at least in the short term. These results support previous empirical findings and have strong implications for how committees should communicate.

Suggested Citation

  • Anke Weber, 2010. "Communication, Decision making, and the Optimal Degree of Transparency of Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(3), pages 1-49, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2010:q:3:a:1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Rybinski, Krzysztof, 2007. "Central bank transparency and central bank communication: Editorial introduction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-8, March.
    2. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
    3. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March.
    4. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    5. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ekor, Maxwell & Saka, Jimoh & Adeniyi, Oluwatosin, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee and Monetary Policy Conduct in Nigeria: A Preliminary Investigation," MPRA Paper 60770, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
    2. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    3. Petra Geraats, 2014. "Monetary Policy Transparency," CESifo Working Paper Series 4611, CESifo.
    4. Charemza, Wojciech & Ladley, Daniel, 2016. "Central banks’ forecasts and their bias: Evidence, effects and explanation," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 804-817.
    5. Roman Horváth & Katerina Šmídková & Jan Zápal, 2012. "Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 8(4), pages 1-19, December.
    6. Horváth Roman & Šmídková Kateřina & Zápal Jan, 2016. "Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-62, October.
    7. Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
    8. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September.
    9. Grand, Nathalie & Kamaly, Ahmed, 2017. "On the guidelines of good planning : The case of the Arab region," MPRA Paper 84146, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Jung, Alexander & El-Shagi, Makram, 2015. "Has the publication of minutes helped markets to predict the monetary policy decisions of the Bank of England's MPC?," Working Paper Series 1808, European Central Bank.
    11. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    12. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Have minutes helped markets to predict the MPC's monetary policy decisions?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 222-234.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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