[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hop/hopeec/v40y2008i1p111-132.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Innocenti
Abstract
This paper analyzes the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In the 1950s, Harsanyi draws Nash's solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930), and Schelling proposes a multifaceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behavior, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi's and Schelling's contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. This debate explains why, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi's insights were fully developed later.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 111-132, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:hop:hopeec:v:40:y:2008:i:1:p:111-132
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hope.dukejournals.org/content/40/1/111.full.pdf+html
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    3. Merrill M. Flood, 1958. "Some Experimental Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 5-26, October.
    4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
    6. Nicola Giocoli, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 639-666, Winter.
    7. Robert J. Leonard, 1992. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash / or / The Emergence and Stabilization of the Nash equilibrium," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9214, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    8. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    9. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 109-112, October.
    10. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    12. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(2), pages 187-194, January.
    13. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    14. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(3), pages 316-322, April.
    15. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
    16. M. Shubik & K. Okuguchi & K. Borchardt & F. Schneider, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 207-218, June.
    17. Robert L. Bishop, 1963. "Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 77(4), pages 559-602.
    18. John C. Harsanyi, 1962. "Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 6(1), pages 29-38, March.
    19. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    20. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 445-454, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pope, Devin G. & Pope, Jaren C. & Sydnor, Justin R., 2015. "Focal points and bargaining in housing markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 89-107.
    2. Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," TSE Working Papers 10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Innocenti, Alessandro, 2010. "How a psychologist informed economics: The case of Sidney Siegel," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 421-434, June.
    4. Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," TSE Working Papers 11-274, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Correa Romar, 2014. "Mathematical Foci," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 5-11, August.
    6. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2011. "An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals," LERNA Working Papers 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    7. Bolton, Gary E. & Karagözoğlu, Emin, 2016. "On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 164-179.
    8. Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "How can a psychologist inform economics? The strange case of Sidney Siegel," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0808, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Other publications TiSEM 7779b0f9-bef5-45c7-ae6b-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Hanato, Shunsuke, 2019. "Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 361-379.
    3. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Faruk Gul, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-174, Summer.
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "On the Interpretation of Two Theoretical Models of Bargaining," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275560, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Adriana Breccia, 2006. "Sequential Bargaining in a Stochastic Environment," Discussion Papers 06/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
    8. Kjell Hausken, 1997. "Game-theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(6), pages 511-528, December.
    9. Benoît Lengaigne, 2004. "Nash : changement de programme ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 114(5), pages 637-662.
    10. Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Christoph Zott, 2002. "When Adaptation Fails," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(6), pages 727-753, December.
    13. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
    14. S. Yu & E. C. Ierland & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu, 2017. "Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 709-729, October.
    15. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    16. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    17. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
    18. Ferenc Forgó & János Fülöp, 2008. "On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 16(4), pages 359-377, December.
    19. Farber, Stephen C. & Costanza, Robert & Wilson, Matthew A., 2002. "Economic and ecological concepts for valuing ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 375-392, June.
    20. Tobias W. Langenegger & Michael Ambühl, 2018. "Negotiation Engineering: A Quantitative Problem-Solving Approach to Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 9-31, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    John Harsanyi; Thomas C. Schelling; axiom of symmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hop:hopeec:v:40:y:2008:i:1:p:111-132. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Center for the History of Political Economy Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dukeupress.edu/Catalog/ViewProduct.php?viewby=journal&productid=45614 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.