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The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott
Abstract
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  • Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:1997:i:win:p:23-50
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher Phelan & Robert M. Townsend, 1991. "Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(5), pages 853-881.
    2. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "Recent developments in bank capital regulation of market risks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-51, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 227-245, March.
    4. Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993. "An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-1542, September.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    6. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution With Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 427-453.
    7. Kenneth Spong, 2000. "Banking regulation : its purposes, implementation, and effects," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, number 2000bria, March.
    8. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1980. "Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(4), pages 696-715, November.
    9. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1996. "The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 160-183, April.
    10. John Christensen, 1981. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 661-674, Autumn.
    11. David A. Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1996. "Bank capital for market risk: a study in incentive compatible regulation," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rossignolo, Adrián F. & Fethi, Meryem Duygun & Shaban, Mohamed, 2013. "Market crises and Basel capital requirements: Could Basel III have been different? Evidence from Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIGS)," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1323-1339.
    2. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1999. "Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-157.
    3. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    4. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 137-143.
    5. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    6. Shabir, Mohsin & Jiang, Ping & Bakhsh, Satar & Zhao, Zhongxiu, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty and bank stability: Threshold effect of institutional quality and competition," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    7. Jezabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 37-56.
    8. Shehzad, Choudhry Tanveer & De Haan, Jakob, 2015. "Supervisory powers and bank risk taking," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 15-24.
    9. João A. C. Santos, 2000. "Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: a review of the literature," BIS Working Papers 90, Bank for International Settlements.
    10. Shuji Kobayakawa, 1998. "Designing incentive-compatible regulation in banking: the role of penalty in the precommitment approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 145-153.
    11. Casellina, Simone & Pandolfo, Giuseppe & Quagliariello, Mario, 2020. "Applying the Pre-Commitment Approach to bottom-up stress tests: A new old story," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).

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    Keywords

    Bank supervision;

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