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Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1

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  • Sertel, Murat R.
  • Sanver, M. Remzi
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  • Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 1999. "Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-162, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:149-162
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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
    3. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
    4. Tian, Guoqiang, 1991. "Implementation of Lindahl allocations with nontotal--nontransitive preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 247-259, November.
    5. Bezalel Peleg, 1996. "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 311-324, December.
    6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    7. L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
    8. Tian, Guoqiang, 1990. "Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 443-452, August.
    9. Guoqiang Tian, 1989. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 613-621.
    10. Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December.
    11. Tian, Guoqiang, 1993. "Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 169-179.
    12. Otani, Yoshihiko & Sicilian, Joseph, 1982. "Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-68, June.
    13. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, September.
    14. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    15. Sertel, Murat R., 1994. "Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 167-171, October.
    16. Otani, Yoshihiko & Sicilian, Joseph, 1990. "Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 295-312, August.
    17. Sertel, Murat R. & Yildiz, Muhamet, 1998. "The Lindahl solution with changing population and resources1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 151-163, March.
    18. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    19. Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1991. "Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-79, February.
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    1. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
    2. Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth D. Myles, 2009. "Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 565-598, August.
    3. Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
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