A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.002
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References listed on IDEAS
- Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
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Cited by:
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- Katarina Cechlarova & Bettina Klaus & David F.Manlove, 2018. "Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
- Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
- Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.
- Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
- Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Hadi Hosseini & Sujoy Sikdar & Rohit Vaish & Lirong Xia, 2022. "Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences," Papers 2203.07279, arXiv.org.
- Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 8-12.
- Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
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Keywords
Object allocation; Lexicographic preferences; Strategy-proofness; Envy-freeness; Efficiency;All these keywords.
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