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Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty

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  • Benson, Alan
Abstract
This study asks why hospitals provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty. This support is striking because nursing education is clearly general, clearly paid by the firm, and information asymmetries appear minimal. Using AHA and survey data, I find hospitals employing a greater share of their MSA's registered nurses are more likely to provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty, net of size and other institutional controls. Given the institutional context, I interpret this result as unusually specific evidence that technologically general skill training may be made de facto-specific by imperfect and costly mobility.

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  • Benson, Alan, 2013. "Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 149-159.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:1:p:149-159
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.09.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Muehlemann & Paul Ryan & Stefan C. Wolter, 2013. "Monopsony Power, Pay Structure, and Training," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(5), pages 1097-1114, October.
    2. Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, 2023. "Labor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 76(3), pages 475-503, May.
    3. Stockinger, Bastian & Zwick, Thomas, 2016. "Apprentice Poaching in Regional Labor Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145565, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Jens MohrenweiserBy & Gabriele Wydra-Somaggio & Thomas Zwick, 2020. "Information advantages of training employers despite credible training certificates," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 651-671.
    5. Elizabeth Munnich & Abigail Wozniak, 2020. "What Explains the Rising Share of US Men in Registered Nursing?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(1), pages 91-123, January.
    6. Evan Starr, 2019. "Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 783-817, August.
    7. Jens Mohrenweiser & Thomas Zwick & Uschi Backes‐Gellner, 2019. "Poaching and Firm‐Sponsored Training," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(1), pages 143-181, March.
    8. Suman Ghosh & Kameshwari Shankar, 2017. "Optimal Enforcement Of Noncompete Covenants," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 305-318, January.
    9. Manning, Alan, 2011. "Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 973-1041, Elsevier.
    10. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby & Zwick, Thomas, 2015. "Work-related ability as source of information advantages of training employers," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Faria, João Ricardo & Caudill, Steven B. & Mixon, Franklin G. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2021. "Cooperation and spillovers in healthcare R&D: Theory and evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 68-75.
    12. Dan A. Black & Lars Skipper & Jeffrey A. Smith & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2023. "Firm Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 10268, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Training and education; Monopsony and labor market segmentation; Nursing Manpower and Shortages; Labor Mobility; Firm-sponsored general education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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