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The impact of bank regulation on the cost of credit: Evidence from a discontinuity in capital requirements

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  • Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia
  • Moscatelli, Mirko
  • Pietrosanti, Stefano
Abstract
We study the effect on credit relationships of the Small and Medium Enterprises Supporting Factor (SME-SF), a regulatory risk weight reduction on small loans to SMEs. Employing a regression discontinuity design and matched bank-firm data from Italy, we find that a 1 percent drop in capital requirements causes an average 13 basis points reduction in the cost of credit. Moreover, with a novel measure of bank regulatory capital scarcity, we show that the drop is larger for banks facing tighter constraints. Furthermore, the drop is larger for firms with low switching costs, while the sharp assignment rule may have led to the rationing of marginal borrowers. Such findings indicate that the entire distribution of firms and banks’ characteristics plays a crucial role in determining the impact of regulatory capital changes.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia & Moscatelli, Mirko & Pietrosanti, Stefano, 2023. "The impact of bank regulation on the cost of credit: Evidence from a discontinuity in capital requirements," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:55:y:2023:i:c:s1042957323000232
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101040
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital requirements; SME; Cost of credit; Credit access; Switching costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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