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Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups

Author

Listed:
  • Wilson, David Sloan
  • Ostrom, Elinor
  • Cox, Michael E.
Abstract
This article generalizes a set of core design principles for the efficacy of groups that was originally derived for groups attempting to manage common-pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems, forests, and fisheries. The dominant way of thinking until recently was that commons situations invariably result in the tragedy of overuse, requiring either privatization (when possible) or top-down regulation. Based on a worldwide database of CPR groups, Ostrom proposed a set of principles that broadly captured the essential aspects of the institutional arrangements that succeeded, as contrasted to groups whose efforts failed. These principles can be generalized in two respects: first, by showing how they follow from foundational evolutionary principles; and second, by showing how they apply to a wider range of groups. The generality of the core design principles enables them to be used as a practical guide for improving the efficacy of many kinds of groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilson, David Sloan & Ostrom, Elinor & Cox, Michael E., 2013. "Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 21-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:90:y:2013:i:s:p:s21-s32
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
    3. Wilson, David Sloan & Gowdy, John M., 2013. "Evolution as a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 3-10.
    4. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elinor Ostrom; Common pool resource groups; Core design principles; Multilevel selection; Biocultural evolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching
    • D - Microeconomics
    • H - Public Economics
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics

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