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Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions

Author

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  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Vinogradov, Dmitri
Abstract
In Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions (LUPA) all participants pay a bidding fee and the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins. Many LUPAs do not specify what happens with the item on offer if there is no unmatched bid. The item may remain with the auctioneer which may appear unfair given that the auctioneer collects the bidding fees. We show that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a LUPA with known prize both players and the auctioneer will have an expected profit of zero. Moreover, LUPAs may be seen as a value-revealing mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2016. "Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 98-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:98-102
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:awi:wpaper:0471 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2015. "Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-17.
    3. Marco Scarsini & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions," Papers 1007.4264, arXiv.org.
    4. Robert Östling & Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Eileen Y. Chou & Colin F. Camerer, 2011. "Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-33, August.
    5. Raviv, Yaron & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Gambling by auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 369-378, May.
    6. Harold Houba & Dinard Laan & Dirk Veldhuizen, 2011. "Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 269-295, August.
    7. Rapoport, Amnon & Otsubo, Hironori & Kim, Bora & Stein, William E., 2007. "Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 4185, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jul 2007.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Dominiak & Ani Guerdjikova, 2021. "Special Issue on Ambiguity and Strategic Interactions in Honor of Jürgen Eichberger," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 301-307, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unmatched bid auction; Selling mechanism; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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