[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v117y2012i3p636-638.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A market interpretation of the proportional extended core

Author

Listed:
  • Bejan, Camelia
  • Gómez, Juan Camilo
Abstract
Any TU-game can be generated from a production economy with indivisible labor inputs. An equilibrium of that economy always exists after a central intervention that taxes income and subsidizes production. The set of equilibrium allocations corresponding to the smallest income tax coincides with the proportional extended core of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Bejan, Camelia & Gómez, Juan Camilo, 2012. "A market interpretation of the proportional extended core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 636-638.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:636-638
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512004454
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    2. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    3. Billera, Louis J., 1974. "On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 129-139, August.
    4. Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2000. "On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 165-173, May.
    5. Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1997. "On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 81-101, November.
    6. Inoue, Tomoki, 2011. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 430, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2009. "Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 3-16, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2021. "Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 302(1), pages 23-47, July.
    2. Camelia Bejan & Juan Camilo Gómez, 2018. "Equal treatment without large numbers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1239-1259, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 529-554, November.
    2. Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
    3. Fatma Aslan & Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2019. "Duality for General TU-games Redefined," Working Papers CIE 121, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    4. Inoue, Tomoki, 2012. "Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 143-147.
    5. Brangewitz, Sonja & Gamp, Jan-Philip, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the core of TU market games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 454, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Kovalenkov, A. & Holtz Wooders, M., 1997. "Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 392.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    7. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    8. Camelia Bejan & Juan Camilo Gómez, 2017. "Employment lotteries, endogenous firm formation and the aspiration core," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 215-226, October.
    9. Myrna Wooders & Alexander Kovalenkov, 2001. "Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments Nonemptiness and equal treatment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(5), pages 1.
    10. Inoue, Tomoki, 2011. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 430, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    11. Fatma Aslan & Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Non-cohesive TU-games: Duality and P-core," Working Papers CIE 136, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    12. Fatma Aslan & Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Non-cohesive TU-games: Efficiency and Duality," Working Papers CIE 138, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    13. Camelia Bejan & Juan Camilo Gómez, 2018. "Equal treatment without large numbers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1239-1259, November.
    14. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    15. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006. "The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 180-197, April.
    16. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Grabisch, Michel, 2016. "Multicoalitional solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-10.
    17. Meseguer-Artola, Antoni & Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Martinez-Legaz, Juan-Enrique, 2003. "Representing games as coalition production economies with public goods," Economic Research Papers 269482, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    18. Jingang Zhao, 2018. "A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 111-132, December.
    19. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    20. Brangewitz, Sonja & Gamp, Jan-Philip, 2016. "Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 453, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Core extensions; Market games; Taxes and subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:636-638. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.