Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
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- Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, David K. Levine.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Francisco Silva, 2016.
"Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?,"
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477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 538, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Brenton Kenkel, 2019. "The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 370-402, July.
- Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
- Raphaela Hennigs, 2021. "Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 710-731, August.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2020.
"Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
- Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Matteo M. Marini & Aurora García-Gallego & Luca Corazzini, 2018. "Communication in a threshold public goods game with ambiguity: Anomalies and regularities," Working Papers 2018/03, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011.
"On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
- Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
- Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 234-259.
- Xiu Chen & Fuhai Hong & Xiaojian Zhao, 2020. "Concentration and variability of forecasts in artificial investment games: an online experiment on WeChat," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 815-847, September.
- Matros, Alexander & Ponomareva, Natalia & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Search without looking," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
- Chang Jen-Wen, 2020. "Should the Talk be Cheap in Contribution Games?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-16, June.
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