[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v4y1992i3p347-372.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Banks, Jeffrey S.
  • Calvert, Randall L.
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L., 1992. "A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 347-372, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:347-372
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0899-8256(92)90044-S
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bhaskar, V., 2000. "Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 247-262, August.
    2. Correia, A.D. & Leestmaker, L.L. & Stoof, H.T.C. & Broere, J.J., 2022. "Asymmetric games on networks: Towards an Ising-model representation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 593(C).
    3. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023. "Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 957-992, December.
    4. Battiston, Pietro & Harrison, Sharon G., 2024. "Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 223-247.
    5. Johannes Hörner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Mediation and Peace," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1483-1501.
    6. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2020. "The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 403-415.
    8. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
    9. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    10. Zhuozheng Li & Huanxing Yang & Lan Zhang, 2019. "Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 109-141, March.
    11. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
    12. Randall L. Clavert & James Johnson, "undated". "Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    13. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    14. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    15. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:347-372. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.