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Nonmanipulable Cores

Author

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  • Demange, Gabrielle
Abstract
An effectivity function describes the blocking power of coalitions on subsets of alternatives. Given a preference profile, if any coalition blocks an alternative whenever it can, using its own power and making all of its members better off, only alternatives in the core can be reached. In this paper, the author studies the incen tives of the coalitions to use this power truthfully, i.e., to not ma nipulate. Some wellknown cores, among them the core of an exchange ec onomy, are manipulable. The author gives sufficient conditions on an effectivity function that assures its core is nonmanipulable. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-1074, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:5:p:1057-74
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.
    2. Ehlers, Lars, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
    3. Stefano Vannucci, 2004. "A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires," Department of Economics University of Siena 437, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    4. Demange, Gabrielle, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 83-104, January.
    5. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
    6. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
    7. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers 1528, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    8. Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 287-294.
    9. Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2014. "Moral hazard and stability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 659-682, October.
    10. Masashi Umezawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 151-158, June.
    11. Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Departmental Working Papers 199810, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    12. Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3965, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    13. Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1997. "Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-12, September.
    14. Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 209(1), pages 57-62, February.
    15. Ravi Jagadeesan & Scott Duke Kominers & Ross Rheingans-Yoo, 2020. "Lone wolves in competitive equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 215-228, August.
    16. Klaus Nehring & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2003. "Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences," Working Papers 193, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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