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Rating-Agenturen: fehlbar und überfordert

Author

Listed:
  • Hans-Helmut Kotz
  • Dorothea Schäfer
Abstract
Since the second half of the 1990s, three major financial crises occurred, each with a significant involvement of rating agencies (RAs). Their rather poor performance palpably shows that they did not live up to their promises. RAs have proven to be fallible and overburdened. Given the task to which they devote themselves (evaluation of creditworthiness), this is somewhat inevitable. However, the same also holds true for their functional substitutes. Nonetheless, the importance of RAs has substantially increased over the decades. A decisive reason for this is their administered or “compulsory usage”, an immediate consequence from hardwiring their judgments in laws and regulations. This, notwithstanding the fact, that the rating market is systematically imperfect or incomplete. Only a very limited number of rating providers can exist. The RAmarket shows features of a public good: rating information is non- exclusive and non-rival, and economies of scale and network externalities exist. Thus, such a market structure suggests either a binding public regulatory framework. Or (autonomous) public institutions might provide (supplementary) ratings, and/or a regulated competition for mandatory external ratings could be initiated. Hence, the prevailing extensive reference to RAs' opinions in regulatory prescriptions is not justifiable. It should be largely eliminated. Seit der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er gab es drei gravierende Finanzkrisen, jeweils mit einer erheblichen Beteiligung der Rating-Agenturen (RAs). Im Lichte der erzielten Ergebnisse entsprechen RAs nicht ihren Leistungsversprechen. Sie erweisen sich als fehlbar und überfordert. Das ist angesichts der Aufgabe, der sie sich widmen (Kreditwürdigkeitsprüfung), unvermeidlich. Es gilt allerdings auch für ihre Substitute. Dennoch kam es über die Jahrzehnte zu einem erheblichen Bedeutungszuwachs der RAs. Ein zentraler Grund dafür ist deren „administrierte Zwangsnutzung“, die durch die Verankerung von Ratingurteilen in Gesetzen und Regulierungen etabliert wurde. Dabei sind Rating-Märkte systematisch imperfekt oder unvollständig. Es kann nur eine stark begrenzte Zahl von Rating-Anbietern geben. Die RA-Märkte weisen Öffentliche-Guts- Kennzeichen auf: Ihre Nutzung ist nicht-ausschließbar und auch nichtrivalisierend; es gibt Losgrößenvorteile und Netzwerkexternalitäten. Eine solche Marktstruktur legt bindende öffentliche Rahmenvorgaben sowie eine (ergänzende) Selbsterstellung durch öffentliche Institutionen und/oder regulierten Wettbewerb um Ratingmandate (verpflichtenden Fremdbezug) nahe. Die umfängliche Referenz auf RA-Urteile in öffentlichen Vorgaben ist nicht begründbar. Sie sollte weitestgehend reduziert werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Helmut Kotz & Dorothea Schäfer, 2013. "Rating-Agenturen: fehlbar und überfordert," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 82(4), pages 135-162.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:82-4-9
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.82.4.135
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit rating agencies; financial crisis; financial regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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