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Institutional change and information production

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  • LANDINI, FABIO
Abstract
The organization of information production is undergoing a deep transformation. Alongside corporations, which have been for long time the predominant institutions of information production, new organizational forms have emerged, e.g. free software communities, open-content on-line wikis, and collective blogs. The paper investigates the factors that favoured the emergence of these alternative systems, called peer production. Different from the previous literature, the paper considers technology as an endogenous variable in the process of organizational design. On this basis, the paper argues that the diffusion of digital technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain the emergence of peer production. A similarly important role has been played by the set of ethics that motivated the early adherents to the free software movement. Such an ethics indeed operated as a ‘cultural subsidy’ that helped to overcome the complementarities existing among distinct institutional domains, and let a new organizational species to emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Landini, Fabio, 2013. "Institutional change and information production," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 257-284, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:9:y:2013:i:03:p:257-284_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Roberto Casarin & Niccolò Casnici & Pierpaolo Dondio & Flaminio Squazzoni, 2015. "Back to Basics! The Educational Gap of Online Investors and the Conundrum of Virtual Communities," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 51-69, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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