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L'introduction de l'hypothèse d'asymétrie d'information dansla théorie du protectionnisme

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  • Antoine Bouët
Abstract
The introduction of the asymmetric information hypothesis in the political economy of protectionism is fruitful. We address this issue by modelling an international oligopolistic competition with a trade policy decision. The local government has set up an anti-dumping procedure, as it has been authorized by the World Trade Organization. When domestic firms are demanding it, this procedure allows for the imposition of ?individualized protection?, which accounts for the conditions of international competition. But governments have not the necessary information in order to set optimal policies. This information is private and belongs to domestic firms. This characterizes a political decision under asymmetric information. We define pooling and separating equilibria of this game. The conclusion presents the possibility of trade policy decision under moral hazard.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Bouët, 2005. "L'introduction de l'hypothèse d'asymétrie d'information dansla théorie du protectionnisme," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(5), pages 561-572.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_155_0561
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