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Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions. Des résultats expérimentaux

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Meidinger
  • Stéphane Robin
  • Bernard Ruffieux
Abstract
This paper presents some experimental results that focus on players? coordination on Pareto-optimal issues of the investment game. These results show the importance of communication of intentions as a mean to realize such a coordination in different contexts (simultaneous or sequential game, with or without cheap talk, repeated game with or without a mediator).

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Meidinger & Stéphane Robin & Bernard Ruffieux, 2001. "Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions. Des résultats expérimentaux," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 111(1), pages 67-93.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_111_0067
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel L. Chen & Martin Schonger, 2023. "Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory," Post-Print hal-04550734, HAL.
    2. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economic; game; coordination; reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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