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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Mailath George J.

    (University of Pennsylvania, gmailath@econ.sas.upenn.edu)

  • Matthews Steven A.

    (University of Pennsylvania, stevenma@econ.upenn.edu)

  • Sekiguchi Tadashi

    (Kobe University, sekiguchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp)

Abstract
We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Mailath George J. & Matthews Steven A. & Sekiguchi Tadashi, 2002. "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1046
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    Keywords

    Private strategies; repeated games; public perfect equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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