On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible
Author
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0273
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.
- Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
References listed on IDEAS
- Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.
- Yves Oytana, 2014.
"The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 537-570, September.
- Yves Oytana, 2014. "The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy," Post-Print hal-01410633, HAL.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Winand Emons, 2006.
"Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees,"
American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(1), pages 20-32.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0419, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cheng Wang, 2000.
"Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July.
- Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Shavell, Steven, 1995. "The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 379-426, June.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dana, James D, Jr & Spier, Kathryn E, 1993. "Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 349-367, October.
- Hay, Bruce L, 1997. "Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 259-278, January.
- Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223-247.
- Eric Helland & Seth A. Seabury, 2013. "Contingent-fee contracts in litigation: A survey and assessment," Chapters, in: Jennifer H. Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, chapter 15, pages 383-413, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Tim Friehe & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2019.
"Rent Seeking and Bias in Appeals Systems,"
The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 117-157.
- Tim Friehe & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2017. "Rent Seeking and Bias in Appeals Systems," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2017-01, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
- Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012.
"Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 372, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "The Appeals Process and Incentives to Settle," MPRA Paper 59424, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015.
"Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
- Christian At & Yannick Gabuthy, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Agency Relationship in Sequential Litigation," Post-Print halshs-01309094, HAL.
- Michelle J. White, 2002. "Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation: Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials," NBER Working Papers 9362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012.
"Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
- Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Steven Shavell, 2006. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2016. "Contingent Fees with Legal Discovery," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 18(1), pages 155-175.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Giuliana Palumbo, 2007. "Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-Maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 657-682, December.
- Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, 2015. "Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 100-127, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
"The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper 106427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick W Schmitz, 2022.
"How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020.
"Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 13841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 97912, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015.
"Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
- Christian At & Yannick Gabuthy, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Agency Relationship in Sequential Litigation," Post-Print halshs-01309094, HAL.
- Patrick W Schmitz, 2022.
"How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014.
"Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Working Papers hal-04141314, HAL.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016.
"Optimal sales force compensation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
- Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2017.
"Authority and Incentives in Organizations,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 7271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 412, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
- Pi, Jiancai, 2014. "Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 274-277.
- Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2015. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 833-862, October.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-organizing teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 195-197.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015.
"Merger efficiency and managerial incentives,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2021. "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 965-981.
- Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, 2010. "Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 333-357, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fabio Römeis & Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2022. "Salience Bias and Overwork," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, January.
- David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016.
"How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
- Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," TSE Working Papers 12-315, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," IDEI Working Papers 724, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01328640, HAL.
- David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2016. "How to design infrastructure contracts in a warning world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships," Post-Print halshs-01328640, HAL.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019.
"Attorney fees in repeated relationships,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
- Graham, Brad & Robles, Jack, 2016. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Working Paper Series 5074, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
- Chopard Bertrand & Fain Edwige & Roussey Ludivine, 2018.
"Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?,"
Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, July.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Faïn & Ludivine Roussey, 2017. "Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Post-Print hal-04134740, HAL.
- Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012.
"Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
- Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
litigation; appeals; moral hazard; optimal contract;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:19:y:2019:i:2:p:11:n:12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.