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Susceptibility to Inattention: Unpacking Who is Susceptible to Inattention in Energy‐Based Electronic Billing

Author

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  • Cali Curley
  • Galib Rustamov
  • Nicky Harrison
  • Madeline Venable
Abstract
In this paper, we examine characteristics that may change the susceptibility to inattention in electronic billing (e‐billing). Digitization of energy bills can increase the delivery of energy feedback and increase knowledge around conservation efforts, only when attention remains at similar levels to that of paper bills. We hypothesize that only subsets of the population are susceptible to inattention in e‐billing. We do this by estimating energy consumption for e‐bill and paper billers controlling for several characteristics of participants, homes, and weather in the City of Tallahassee, Florida. We use a difference‐in‐differences (DD) approach to estimate the effects of the e‐bill participation, which is a common approach for observational and quasi‐experimental settings. We find that budget constraints limit an individual’s susceptibility to inattention in e‐billing, with lower income groups decreasing energy consumption on average by 4.4% but has no effect on higher income groups. This suggests that inattention may not occur at the same levels or for the same reasons for all members of the public. This has implications regarding the practice of policy design and communication strategies for the public at large. 本文中，我们分析了一系列特征，这些特征可能改变对电子账单（e‐billing）忽视的敏感性。只有当对电子账单和纸质账单的关注保持相似时，能源账单的数字化才能增加能源反馈的交付，并增进对节能举措的了解。我们假设，仅部分人群对电子账单的忽视保持敏感。为此，我们预测了佛罗里达州塔拉哈西市的电子账单和纸质账单的能源消费，对参与者、住所、天气等特征进行控制。我们使用双重差分法（DD）预测电子账单参与发挥的作用，此法是观察和准实验研究的常用方法。我们发现，预算限制约束了个人对电子账单忽视的敏感性，低收入群体在能源消费上平均减少了4.4%，但这对高收入群体未产生影响。这暗示，信息忽视可能不会因同一原因对所有人发挥相同作用。该研究发现对针对大多数人的政策设计实践和传播策略具有意义。 En este artículo, examinamos las características que pueden cambiar la susceptibilidad a la falta de atención en la facturación electrónica (e‐billing). La digitalización de las facturas de energía puede aumentar la entrega de información sobre energía y aumentar el conocimiento sobre los esfuerzos de conservación, solo cuando la atención permanece en niveles similares a los de las facturas en papel. Presumimos que solo subconjuntos de la población son susceptibles a la falta de atención en la facturación electrónica. Hacemos esto mediante la estimación del consumo de energía de los emisores de facturas electrónicas y de papel controlando varias características de los participantes, los hogares y el clima en la ciudad de Tallahassee, Florida. Utilizamos un enfoque de diferencias en diferencias (DD) para estimar los efectos de la participación en la factura electrónica, que es un enfoque común para entornos observacionales y cuasiexperimentales. Descubrimos que las restricciones presupuestarias limitan la susceptibilidad de un individuo a la falta de atención en la facturación electrónica, y los grupos de ingresos más bajos reducen el consumo de energía en promedio un 4,4%, pero no tienen ningún efecto en los grupos de ingresos más altos. Esto sugiere que la falta de atención puede no ocurrir en los mismos niveles o por las mismas razones para todos los miembros del público. Esto tiene implicaciones con respecto a la práctica del diseño de políticas y estrategias de comunicación para el público en general.

Suggested Citation

  • Cali Curley & Galib Rustamov & Nicky Harrison & Madeline Venable, 2020. "Susceptibility to Inattention: Unpacking Who is Susceptible to Inattention in Energy‐Based Electronic Billing," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(6), pages 744-764, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:37:y:2020:i:6:p:744-764
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12404
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