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Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Means-tested Benefits

Author

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  • Cagri S. Kumru
  • John Piggott
Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between capital income taxation and a means tested age pension in the context of an overlapping generations model, calibrated to the UK economy. Recent literature has suggested a rehabilitation of capital income taxation (Conesa et al. (2009)), predicated on the idea that capital is a complement with retirement leisure. This leads naturally to the conjecture that a publicly funded age pension contingent upon holdings of capital or capital income may have a similar effect. We formalize this using a stochastic OLG model with multiple individuals differentiated by labour productivity and pension entitlement. Our preliminary findings suggest that a means tested pension has effects similar to capital income taxation in a life-cycle context.
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Suggested Citation

  • Cagri S. Kumru & John Piggott, 2017. "Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Means-tested Benefits," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(3), pages 227-262, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:64:y:2017:i:3:p:227-262
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/sjpe.12130
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2012. "Optimal Taxation with Current and Future Cohorts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3973, CESifo.
    2. Wheadon, Daniel & Castex, Gonzalo & Kudrna, George & Woodland, Alan, 2024. "Non-linear means-tested pensions: Welfare and distributional analyses," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    3. Woodland, A., 2016. "Taxation, Pensions, and Demographic Change," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 713-780, Elsevier.
    4. George Kudrna, 2015. "Means Testing of Public Pensions: The Case of Australia," Working Papers wp338, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    5. Kudrna, George, 2016. "Economy-wide effects of means-tested pensions: The case of Australia," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 7(C), pages 17-29.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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