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A State Within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948–1973)

Author

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  • Helge Berger
  • Jakob De Haan
Abstract
In this paper we analyse certain periods in the history of the Bundesbank concentrating on the determinants of central bank independence as suggested in the literature. The Bundesbank law of 1957 was born only after a long and tedious political process which outcome was initially not at all clear. It is concluded that some determinants outlined in the literature played indeed a role in the making of the Bundesbank Law of 1957. Still, the Bundesbank was put in charge of the Dmark by the Allieds and this proved to be advantagous for the new institution, as was the subsequent debate about federalism. We argue that popular backing is one of the important forces in support of the Bundesbank's independence. However, this support is not exogenous, as the Bundesbank has always tried to influence public opinion. Our analysis of the conflicts between the Bundesbank and the federal government over monetary policy suggest that if a conflict concerned interest rate policy, the Bundesbank always got its way. Even with respect to exchange rate policy, which is primarily in the realm of the federal government, the position of the Bundesbank often prevailed, as the Bundesbank behaved skilfully. The history of the Bundesbank also provides ample evidence of coordination problems with fiscal policy that may arise with two independent players. Finally, it is clear that the theory on the determinants of central bank independence overlooks that very often the government and the Bundesbank were not two monolithic entities, but that there were different views about policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan, 1999. "A State Within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948–1973)," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 17-39, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:46:y:1999:i:1:p:17-39
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00118
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Chadi & Matthias Krapf, 2017. "The Protestant Fiscal Ethic: Religious Confession And Euro Skepticism In Germany," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1813-1832, October.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    3. repec:dgr:rugccs:200108 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2021. "Explaining central bank trust in an inflation-targeting country: the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 27-48.
    5. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 2001. "The German political business cycle: money demand rather than monetary policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 609-631, September.
    6. Maier, Philipp & Knaap, Thijs, 2002. "Who supported the Deutsche Bundesbank?: An empirical investigation," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 831-851, December.
    7. Hayo, Bernd & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2024. "Preaching to the agnostic: Inflation reporting can increase trust in the central bank but only among people with weak priors," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    8. Pierre L. Siklos & Martin T. Bohl, 2005. "The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(2), pages 395-409, October.
    9. Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2018. "Central Bank Independence in New Zealand: Public Knowledge About and Attitude Towards the Policy Target Agreement," ifo Working Paper Series 266, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    10. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Robert Inklaar & Jakob de Haan, 2003. "Restructuring the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 1084, CESifo.
    11. Diaf, Sami & Döpke, Jörg & Fritsche, Ulrich & Rockenbach, Ida, 2022. "Sharks and minnows in a shoal of words: Measuring latent ideological positions based on text mining techniques," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    12. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
    13. Adam Geršl, 2006. "Political Pressure on Central Banks: The Case of the Czech National Bank (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(1-2), pages 18-39, January.
    14. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Miroslav Beblavy, 2003. "Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(1), pages 61-68, February.
    16. Hayo, Bernd & Neumeier, Florian, 2020. "Public knowledge about and attitudes towards central bank independence in New Zealand," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    17. Carsten Hefeker, 2021. "Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 287-308, March.
    18. Morys, Matthias, 2003. "Was the Bundesbank’s credibility undermined during the process of German reunification?," Economic History Working Papers 22355, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    19. Fontan, Clément & Goutsmedt, Aurélien, 2023. "The ECB and the inflation monsters: strategic framing and the responsibility imperative (1998-2023)," SocArXiv 92r54, Center for Open Science.
    20. Bernd Hayo & Matthias Uhl, 2011. "The Effects of Legislated Tax Changes in Germany," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201142, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    21. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.

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