The current U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program is an all-or-nothing system that has been criticized for creating strong work disincentives. In an empirically grounded and calibrated life-cycle model, I simulate behavioral responses to a partial disability benefit system, a policy alternative to the current program, which allows individuals to claim partial disability and combine earnings with disability benefits. Simulation results show financial savings for the program as well as welfare improvements for individuals with disabilities."> The current U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program is an all-or-nothing system that has been criticized for creating strong work disincentives. In an empirically grounded and calibrated life-cycle model, I simulate behavioral responses to a partial disability benefit system, a policy alternative to the current program, which allows individuals to claim partial disability and combine earnings with disability benefits. Simulation results show financial savings for the program as well as welfare improvements for individuals with disabilities."> The current U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program is an all-or-nothing system that has been criticized for creating strong work disincentive">
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Partial Benefits in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program

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  • Na Yin
Abstract
type="main" xml:lang="en"> The current U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program is an all-or-nothing system that has been criticized for creating strong work disincentives. In an empirically grounded and calibrated life-cycle model, I simulate behavioral responses to a partial disability benefit system, a policy alternative to the current program, which allows individuals to claim partial disability and combine earnings with disability benefits. Simulation results show financial savings for the program as well as welfare improvements for individuals with disabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Na Yin, 2015. "Partial Benefits in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(2), pages 463-504, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:82:y:2015:i:2:p:463-504
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    Cited by:

    1. Raimond Maurer & Olivia S. Mitchell & Ralph Rogalla & Tatjana Schimetschek, 2021. "Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives: Theory and evidence," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 5-27, March.
    2. Eric French & John Bailey Jones, 2017. "Health, Health Insurance, and Retirement: A Survey," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 9(1), pages 383-409, September.
    3. Fichtner, Jason & Seligman, Jason, 2018. "Saving Social Security Disability Insurance: Designing and Testing Reforms through Demonstration Projects," Working Papers 07625, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    4. Kyung-woo Lee, 2019. "Optimal Partial and Full Disability Insurance with an Application to Korea," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 61-107.

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