[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jrinsu/v71y2004i2p253-264.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Demand for Insurance With an Upper Limit on Coverage

Author

Listed:
  • J. David Cummins
  • Olivier Mahul
Abstract
The demand for insurance is examined when the indemnity schedule is subject to an upper limit. The optimal contract is shown to display full insurance above a deductible up to the cap. Some results derived in the standard model with no upper limit on coverage turn out to be invalid; the optimal deductible of an actuarially fair policy is positive and insurance may be a normal good under decreasing absolute risk aversion. An increase in the upper limit would induce the policyholder with constant absolute risk aversion to reduce his or her optimal deductible and therefore this would increase the demand for insurance against small losses.

Suggested Citation

  • J. David Cummins & Olivier Mahul, 2004. "The Demand for Insurance With an Upper Limit on Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 253-264, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:71:y:2004:i:2:p:253-264
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4367.2004.00088.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4367.2004.00088.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0022-4367.2004.00088.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth A. Froot, 1999. "The Financing of Catastrophe Risk," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number froo99-1.
    2. Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, 1990. "Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 243-253.
    3. Christian Gollier & Harris Schlesinger, 1996. "Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 359-363.
    4. Froot, Kenneth A. (ed.), 1999. "The Financing of Catastrophe Risk," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226266237, September.
    5. Meyer, Jack & Ormiston, Michael B, 1999. "Analyzing the Demand for Deductible Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 223-230, October.
    6. MOSSIN, Jan, 1968. "Aspects of rational insurance purchasing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 23, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Gur Huberman & David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith Jr., 1983. "Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 415-426, Autumn.
    8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    9. Picard, Pierre, 2000. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1049-1071, November.
    10. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    2. Chi, Yichun & Zhou, Xun Yu & Zhuang, Sheng Chao, 2024. "Variance insurance contracts," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 62-82.
    3. Chi, Yichun & Zheng, Jiakun & Zhuang, Shengchao, 2022. "S-shaped narrow framing, skewness and the demand for insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 279-292.
    4. Neil A. Doherty & Christian Laux & Alexander Muermann, 2015. "Insuring Nonverifiable Losses," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 283-316.
    5. Chi, Yichun & Zhuang, Sheng Chao, 2022. "Regret-based optimal insurance design," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 22-41.
    6. Christian Gollier, 2014. "Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 555-576, November.
    7. Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. "Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-138, October.
    8. Yichun Chi & Xun Yu Zhou & Sheng Chao Zhuang, 2020. "Variance Contracts," Papers 2008.07103, arXiv.org.
    9. Lu, Zhiyi & Meng, Shengwang & Liu, Leping & Han, Ziqi, 2018. "Optimal insurance design under background risk with dependence," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 15-28.
    10. Michael Breuer, 2005. "Multiple Losses, EX ANTE Moral Hazard, and the Implications for Umbrella Policies," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(4), pages 525-538, December.
    11. Y.M. Ermoliev & S.D. Flam, 2000. "Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts," Working Papers ir00033, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    12. Carole Bernard & Weidong Tian, 2010. "Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 35(1), pages 47-80, June.
    13. Chi, Yichun & Liu, Fangda, 2017. "Optimal insurance design in the presence of exclusion clauses," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 185-195.
    14. Rachel J. Huang & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2007. "Optimal Tax Deductions for Net Losses Under Private Insurance With an Upper Limit," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(4), pages 883-893, December.
    15. Carole Bernard & Weidong Tian, 2009. "Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements Under Tail Risk Measures," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 709-725, September.
    16. Guillaume Carlier & Rose-Anne Dana, 2003. "Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 871-893, June.
    17. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
    18. Zuo Quan Xu, 2018. "Pareto optimal moral-hazard-free insurance contracts in behavioral finance framework," Papers 1803.02546, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    19. Johannes G. Jaspersen & Richard Peter & Marc A. Ragin, 2023. "Probability weighting and insurance demand in a unified framework," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(1), pages 63-109, March.
    20. James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, 2008. "Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 825-846, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:71:y:2004:i:2:p:253-264. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ariaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.