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Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity

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  • CLARE LEAVER
  • MILTIADIS MAKRIS
Abstract
We seek to explain the puzzle of passive industry interests. Taking the formation decision as given, we focus on the ability of a political action committee (PAC) to elicit voluntary donations for campaign giving. We show that, when the number of stakeholders is large and uncertain, PACs behave counteractively. That is, a single PAC that does not oppose the government's prior preference raises resources whenever an opponent poses a credible threat to secure policy favors. By implication money never actually changes hands, prompting the suggestion that counteractive behavior may lie behind the well‐documented, and consistently low, levels of PAC disbursements.

Suggested Citation

  • Clare Leaver & Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(4), pages 571-602, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:571-602
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00279.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2001. "A dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking," CeNDEF Working Papers 01-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    2. Helpman Elhanan & Persson Torsten, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-33, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Michela Redoano, 2010. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 407-435, June.
    3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Tyutin, Anton & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2017. "On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," TSE Working Papers 17-807, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022. "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 357-414, July.
    6. Dal Bó, Ernesto & Dal Bó, Pedro & Di Tella, Rafael, 2006. "“Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 41-53, February.
    7. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    8. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, February.
    10. Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023. "Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions," TSE Working Papers 23-1419, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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