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The Value Of Private Information In Monopoly

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  • ALEXANDER E. SAAK
Abstract
We investigate a basic question about a monopoly with incomplete information: when does the seller have an incentive to allow potential buyers to acquire more private information about their tastes for the seller's product? Under plausible conditions such as log‐concave density of willingness‐to‐pay and convex marginal cost, the seller prefers that the paying customers be well informed as a group but be left in the dark regarding their individual tastes.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander E. Saak, 2008. "The Value Of Private Information In Monopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 169-189, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:169-189
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00337.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Athey, Susan & Levin, Jonathan, 2018. "The value of information in monotone decision problems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 101-116.
    2. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 158, Barcelona School of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Dynamic Informative Advertising of New Experience Goods," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 104-135, March.
    2. Alexander E. Saak, 2011. "A Model of Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1131-1150.
    3. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2011. "Pre-sale information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2333-2355.
    4. H. Müge Yayla‐Küllü & Jennifer K. Ryan & Jayashankar M. Swaminathan, 2021. "Product Line Flexibility for Agile and Adaptable Operations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(3), pages 725-737, March.
    5. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "Optimal provision of information about consumption choices in the presence of a cognitive constraint," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 25-28.

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