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Standard‐Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy

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  • RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
Abstract
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product‐market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard‐setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent‐holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent‐holders before standards are set in order to determine post‐standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Schmalensee, 2009. "Standard‐Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 526-552, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:3:p:526-552
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00388.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hussinger, Katrin & Schwiebacher, Franz, 2013. "The value of disclosing IPR to open standard setting organizations," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-060, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2013. "‘Essential’ Patents, FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 913-937, December.
    3. ., 2013. "Diversity and the evolution of competitive economic systems," Chapters, in: Competition, Diversity and Economic Performance, chapter 6, pages 109-131, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Gandal, Neil & Regibeau, Pierre, 2013. "SSOs: Current Policy Issues and Empirical Evidence," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275825, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Gastón Llanes & Joaquín Poblete, 2020. "Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 270-297, June.
    6. Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko & Xuyao Zhang, 2017. "A Welfare Economic Interpretation of FRAND," IFRO Working Paper 2017/04, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    7. Fu, Xiao & Tan, Guofu & Wang, Jin, 2023. "Policy orientations and technology choices in standards wars," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    8. Schmidt, Julia & Steingress, Walter, 2022. "No double standards: Quantifying the impact of standard harmonization on trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    9. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.
    10. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu & Zhang, Xuyao, 2023. "A conceptual model for FRAND royalty setting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 167-176.
    11. Daniel C. Matisoff & Douglas S. Noonan & John J. O'Brien, 2013. "Convergence in Environmental Reporting: Assessing the Carbon Disclosure Project," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 285-305, July.
    12. Spulber, Daniel F., 2016. "Patent licensing and bargaining with innovative complements and substitutes," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 693-713.
    13. Gastón Llanes, 2019. "Ex-ante Agreements and FRAND Commitments in a Repeated Game of Standard-Setting Organizations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(1), pages 159-174, February.
    14. Bergeaud Antonin & Schmidt Julia & Zago Riccardo, 2022. "Patents that Match your Standards: Firm-level Evidence on Competition and Growth," Working papers 876, Banque de France.
    15. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, 2016. "Multiple Standards: the Case of the French Building Industry," Policy Papers 2016.08, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.

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